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Are court-appointed experCs 
the soluiaion to the problems 
of expert testimony1 
In Texas, court-appointed experts 
are frequently used in family law cases, 
providing a rare opportunity 
to examine how such a system works. 
by Anthony Champagne, Danny Easterling, 
Daniel W. Shuman,Alan Tomkins, Elizabeth Whitaker 
I n contrast with the legal systems of many other countries, the use of privately-retained experts is 
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the dominant method for presenting 
expert testimony in the U.S, I but the 
use of privately-retained rather than 
court-appointed experts has been 
the subject of intense criticism. Crit-
ics argue that privately-retained ex-
perts bias the information provided 
to courts because attorneys shop for 
experts who will present their point 
of view in the most favorable light, 
even though that point of view may 
not be the mainstream scientific one 
or appropriately reflect the consen-
sus of technical or specialized knowl-
edge. 2 Others argue that the use of 
retained experts permits non-main-
stream perspectives to be brought 
1. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: 
A Proposal for Expert judges at the Trial Level, 93 
COLUM. L. REv. 473,474 (1993). For an overview 
of expert testimony issues in a variety of legal 
contexts, see Faigman et al. eds., MODERN SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF SCIENCE 
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997); REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. Federal Judicial 
Center 2000). See also Erichson, Mass Tort Liti-
gation and Inquisitorial justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983 
(1999). Erichson's article includes a useful 
comparison of expert evidence in the U.S. with 
the inquisitorial "legal systems of Germany, 
France, Italy, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Egypt, 
and other civil law countries throughout conti-
nental Europe, Latin America and elsewhere" 
(citations omitted). 
2. Monahan & Walker, Social Science Research 
in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOCIST 
465 (1988) ("[l]awyers sometimes cynically 
178 judicature Volume 84, Number 4 january-February 2001 
pick and choose among studies and experts until 
they find one with conclusions to their liking"). 
3. See, e.g., Black et aI., Science and the Law in the 
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowl-
edge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715 (1994); Saks, Expert Wit-
nesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1990). 
4. See, e.g., Murphy, Note, Experts, Liars, and 
Guns for Hire: A Different Perspective on the Qualifica-
tions of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. LJ. 637 
(1994) . 
5. E.g., Albers et al., Toward a Model Expert Wit-
ness Act: An Examination of the Use of Expert Wit-
nesses and a Proposal for Reform, 80 IOWA L. REV. 
1269, 1276 (1995) ("A major problem that arises 
when experts are used as advocates in the 
adversarial process is that conflicting pressures 
cause experts to slant their testimony ... "). 
6. E.g., Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM. L. 
REv. 45, 61-62 (1866); Foster, Expert Testimony-
Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 
HARv. L. REV. 169 (1897); Hand, Historical and 
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 56 (1901); Friedman, Expert 
Testimony, Its Abuse and Reform, 19 YALE LJ. 247 
(1910); Prettyman, Needed: A New Trial Technique, 
34 A.B.A.]. 766, 769-70 (1948); For a recent over-
view, see Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: 
Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. 
L. REv. 59, 64-74 (1998). 
RICHARD LAURENT 
into court and gives judges little con-
trol over its introduction,3 and that 
privately-retained experts can be ex-
7. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note 
(1972) ( "experience indicates that actual ap-
pointment is a relatively infrequent occur-
renee"). See generally Cecil and Willging, Court-Ap-
pointed Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 525 (Federal Judicial Center, 1994). See 
also Cecil and Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed 
Experts in Federal Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41 (1994). 
8. See, e.g., Carnegie Commission on Science, 
Technology, and Government, SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGYIN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPOR-
TUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES 37 (March, 1993) 
('The present system authorizes the court to ap-
point experts to provide assistance, but courts have 
rarely availed themselves of this opportunity") . 
pensive, since it is likely 
there will be a "battle of the 
experts. "4 Finally, critics ar-
gue that privately-retained 
experts can easily lose their 
objectivity since even com-
petent experts feel pres-
sure to accommodate their 
views to their attorney-em-
ployers. 5 
For at least a century, these 
critics have argued in favor of court-
appointed experts. 6 Although there 
have been criticisms of these propos-
als, arguing that juries may be lulled 
into a false sense of security about 
court-appointed experts' compe-
tence and objectivity, proposals for 
the use of court-appointed experts 
abound. Yet the use of court-ap-
pointed experts has been the subject 
of little study.7 Moreover, notwith-
standing courts' express or inherent 
authority to appoint experts8 and the 
enthusiasm expressed in favor of 
January-February 2001 Volume 84, Number 4 Judicature 179 
court-appointed experts, in most 
American civil and criminal settings 
the use of court-appointed experts is 
exceptional. 9 
However, one area of law-family 
law-makes use of court appoint-
ments even in non-exceptional cir-
cumstances,IO although use varies 
across jurisdictions. ll In Texas, 
court-appointed experts are fre-
quently used in family law cases 
where there is a child custody dis-
pute. In these cases, judges will ap-
point an expert, often a psycholo-
gist, to examine the parties. Of 
course, lawyers for both sides may 
examine the expert and also present 
privately-retained experts. However, 
unlike other areas of practice where 
the judge's power to appoint experts 
is unexercised, in Texas family law 
cases, at least in counties in which 
those experts exist, judges routinely 
appoint experts. Thus, these cases 
provide a rare opportunity to study 
the operation of a system that relies 
extensively on court-appointed ex-
perts and to assess the claims of its 
superiority to the use of retained ex-
perts. 
Unlike other jurisdictions, family 
law cases can be heard by a jury in 
Texas. Thus, the family law practices 
described below are possibly ger-
mane primarily to Texas. Despite this 
unique situation, we believe the use 
of court-appointed experts in Texas 
is instructive regarding the potential 
usefulness of court appointments of 
experts in general. 
Methodology 
To explore how the court-appoint-
ment process operates and to exam-
ine various perspectives on its opera-
tion, we conducted focus groups with 
family district court judges, board 
certified family lawyers, and court-ap-
pointed experts from Dallas and 
Tarrant counties, Texas. We were 
concerned that a questionnaire 
would not provide information that 
was qualitatively as rich as the focus 
groups both because the number of 
experts and judges was small and be-
cause the number of contested cus-
tody cases that reach trial each year is 
also small. We anticipated that the fo-
cus groups would permit us to ex-
plore more extensively the partici-
pants' reactions to an operating, 
court-appointed expert system. 
Dallas and Tarrant (Ft. Worth) 
counties are both large metropolitan 
centers in north Texas, although they 
are grounded in vastly different legal 
cultures. The smaller of the counties 
is Tarrant, which continues to main-
tain something of a small town cul-
ture. For the most part, the family 
lawyers, experts, and judges know 
one another. As a result, there is 
more of a spirit of cooperation and 
accommodation in Tarrant County 
than in Dallas County, where there is 
greater anonymity. 
We invited board-certified family 
lawyersl2 in Dallas and Tarrant coun-
ties, psychologists who regularly 
served as court-appointed experts, 
and the judges and associate judges 
serving in the family district courts, to 
participate in our focus groups.13 The 
focus groups, then, were comprised 
of self-selected participants. 
The lawyers, judges, and experts 
from each county were interviewed 
in separate groups to prevent one 
occupational or geographic group 
from biasing the responses of an-
other. We identified the experts by 
preliminary interviews of family dis-
trict court judges to learn which 
ones are regularly court appointed. 
The Tarrant County focus groups in-
cluded five board certified family 
lawyers, four experts, and four fam-
ily district court and associate 
9. Cecil and Willging, COURT-ApPOINTED Ex-
PERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED 
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (FederaIJu-
dicial Center, 1993); Champagne, et aI., The Prob-
lem with Empirical Examination of the Use of Court-
Appointed Experts: A Report of Non-findings, 14 BEH. 
SCI. & LAw 361 (1996); But see, e.g., Scott and 
Anderson, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Pro-
posed Implementation of the Guidelines of Daubert and 
Landrigan under the Newly Adopted New Jersey Rules 
of Evidence, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.j. 1, 
54-56 (1994): "Court-appointed experts have 
been used regularly in certain areas of the law in 
New Jersey. They have been used in matters such 
as worker's compensation, competency, attorney 
discipline, and paternity proceedings. 
Court-appointed experts have also been used for 
valuation of stock, in land condemnation pro-
ceedings, and for valuation of land in land swap 
deals. Independent experts are also used exten-
sively in the family law context, in divorce, ali-
mony, custody, and support cases, in addition to 
paternity situations." (citations omitted). 
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judges. The Dallas County focus 
groups included 12 board certified 
family lawyers, four experts, and 
eight family district judges and asso-
ciate judges. Thus, our final sample 
of 37 was comprised of 17 lawyers, 8 
experts, and 12 family district court 
judges and associate judges. 
The experts 
With no dissent, the experts enthusi-
astically supported the use of court-
appointed experts in the family law 
arena. Indeed, although all of them 
were willing to be retained as non-
testifying consulting experts, most 
were unwilling to work as privately-
retained testifying experts. One of 
the reasons experts expressed for fa-
voring court appointment over pri-
vate retention is that court-ap-
pointed experts have access to both 
parents and children in a custody 
dispute, which retained experts 
rarely enjoy in Texas. The experts 
believed that without access to both 
sides they were unable to render sat-
isfactory opinions and that testi-
mony without access to both sides 
was ethically problematic. Indeed, at 
least in rendering an opinion about 
the best interests of a child, the 
American Psychological Association 
Child Custody Guidelines caution 
against a comparative assessment in 
the absence of access to all of the 
parties. 14 Relatedly, the experts had 
personal liability concerns, believ-
ing that they were exposed to liabil-
ity if they were privately retained, 
The use of court-appointed experts is regularly 
used throughout Europe and other inquisitorial-
based legal jurisdictions throughout the world. 
See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (arguing 
Germany's tradition of making extensive use of 
court-appointed rather than party-retained ex-
perts shows the advantages of these practices). 
10. See, e.g., Scott and Anderson, supra n. 9, at 56. 
11. Compare Note, Mcburney, Bitter Battles: The 
Use of Psychological Evaluations in Child Custody Dis-
putes in West Virginia, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 773, 789 
(1995) (only 9 of 14 family law masters inter-
viewed in West Virginia had ever appointed an 
expert to conduct a custody evaluation) with 
Herman and Sullivan, Court-Appointed Experts in 
Child Custody Cases, N.Y.L.j., June 30, 1997, at 7 
"Although a court is not required to appoint an 
independent psychological expert to investigate 
the background and psychological makeup of 
the litigants and their children in every case, 
such an appointment is generally required where 
there are serious issues of parental fitness," citing 
but enjoyed immunity if they were 
court appointed. 
The experts believed court ap-
pointment deprived the attorneys of 
control over them, resulting in 
greater professional independence. 
They believed that as privately-re-
tained experts there was always an el-
ement of distrust toward 
them; they admitted that 
there were some experts 
whose testimony could be 
that as court-appointed experts they 
were less likely to be subject to suit, 
enjoyed greater access to relevant in-
formation, and were unlikely to be 
treated as a hired gun. Indeed, some 
experts suggested that court appoint-
ment cast them in the role of deci-
sion makers as contrasted with the 
The experts believed 
pointed experts and maintained 
that the best experts were the ones 
the lawyers retained. They asserted 
that there were only a half dozen 
competent court-appointed ex-
perts. "Real experts," they argued, 
"work for lawyers." They believed 
that court-appointed experts could 
not succeed in private 
practice, or were inex-
perienced and just be-
ginning a practice and 
and was purchased by at-
torneys. As a court-ap-
pointed expert they per-
ceived that there seemed 
to be less of a question of 
their integrity. And, they 
court appointment deprived 
the attorneys of control 
consequently needed to 
rely on court appoint-
ments. 
In addition to con-
cerns about quality with 
noted, if they were court 
appointed, attorneys had 
a sense that the judge had 
endorsed (or at least 
would listen seriously to) 
over them, resulting 
in greater professional 
independence. 
the use of court-ap-
poin ted experts, both 
Tarrant and Dallas 
county lawyers believed 
that they lose some con-
trol over a case with 
court-appointed experts 
who are independent 
and who have the ap-
their views. 
The experts suggested 
that the use of court-ap-
pointed experts did not invariably re-
duce the costs of a custody dispute as 
cases that proceeded to trial invari-
ably involved both retained and ap-
pointed experts. In these cases the 
use of court-appointed experts in-
creased the costs of experts. How-
ever, when the parents had limited 
resources, court-appointed experts 
often reduced the costs of litigation 
because the court-appointed expert's 
report served as a template for settle-
ment negotiations. This was a signifi-
cant advantage to parties who were 
unable to afford their own experts. 
It is understandable why these ex-
perts preferred to serve as court-ap-
pointed rather than retained experts 
in family law cases. They believed 
Vernon Me. v. Brenda N., 196 A.D.2d 823, 825 (2d 
Dept. 1993); Giraldo v. Giraldo, 85 A.D.2d 164, 
171 (1st Dept. 1982), appeal dismissed, 56 
N.Y.2d 804 (1982). The reason for the variation 
in practice probably reflects the differing no· 
tions regarding the usefulness of court-ap-
pointed evaluations in custody disputes. 
12. The Texas Board of Legal Specialization 
offers certification, authorized by the Supreme 
Court of Texas, in 17 areas oflaw, including fam-
ily law. Certification is not a requirement of 
practice but is intended to help the public learn 
about the experience and education of attorneys 
who are certified in a specialty. 
13. Family district courts, which exist in urban 
areas including Dallas and Ft. Worth, are special-
role of mere witnesses when they 
were retained. Some experts did sug-
gest, however, that court appoint-
ment exacted greater responsibility 
because they were obliged to present 
the entire story in a balanced fash-
ion, rather than just the point of view 
of one side. 
The lawyers 
The lawyers offered a different assess-
ment of the use of retained versus 
appointed experts in family law cases, 
expressing a marked preference for 
retained experts. The lawyers but-
tressed their preference with several 
observations. 
The Dallas County lawyers were 
critical of the quality of court-ap-
ized courts empowered to hear "(1) adoptions; 
(2) birth records; (3) divorce and marriage an-
nulment; (4) child welfare, custody, support and 
reciprocal support, dependency, neglect, and de-
linquency; (5) parent and child; and (6) hus-
band and wife." Tex. Gov't Code §§ 24.601 
(1999). Texas law permits a county to authorize a 
family district court judge to appoint an associate 
judge to hear "any aspect" of a suit over which the 
family court has jurisdiction, subject to the right 
of a party to object to an associate judge hearing 
a trial on the merits. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 201.005 
(1999). 
14. American Psychological Assn., Guidelines 
for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, 
49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677 (1994). 
proval of the judge. But it was not 
simply that a privately-retained ar-
rangement, unlike court appoint-
ment, makes the expert beholden to 
the lawyer. Lawyers feared that they 
would be surprised at trial with a 
court-appointed expert because they 
had less chance to communicate with 
the expert prior to trial. In addition, 
they were less able to control the di-
rection of the court-appointed 
expert's testimony and, unlike pri-
vately-retained experts, when the 
court-appointed expert was favorable 
to their side, they could not prepare 
the expert for the rigors of cross-ex-
amination. 
Additionally, lawyers pointed out 
that privately-retained experts could 
help them with the case in other 
ways. As one lawyer put it, "When 
something is weak about the case, a 
retained expert can 'sniff it out.'" 
Since a court-appointed expert is not 
allied with a lawyer, (s)he cannot be 
relied on to suggest problems and av-
enues for exploration in a case to 
counsel. 
Most, but not all of the lawyers we 
spoke with in Dallas and Tarrant 
counties, had some cases where 
money was no object, where there 
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were essentially unlimited funds 
available. But all the lawyers empha-
sized that high-dollar cases were rare 
and that, for the most part, lawyers 
had to operate within a budget. If, 
one lawyer suggested, there was 
$30,000 available for a case, a court-
appointed expert could cut a large 
sum from the budget, perhaps 
$5,000. That left considerably less for 
hiring retained experts and for a suf-
ficient fee for the lawyers. Still, the Ft. 
Worth lawyers, in particular, empha-
sized that perhaps 80 percent of their 
cases had major financial constraints, 
and for these cases, it might be pos-
sible for a court-appointed expert to 
work for as little as $2,500. In con-
trast, it was typical for retained ex-
perts to cost as much as $10,000 to 
$50,000. In fact, in some rare cases 
retained experts might cost 
$100,000. 
Court-appointed experts, it seems, 
were the poor litigants' experts, even 
though poorer persons- the bottom 
80 percent-might think that the 
cost of the court-appointed expert is 
not trivial. Still, the lawyers had a 
strong preference for privately-re-
tained experts. As one lawyer put it, 
"Trying a custody case without an ex-
pert is like taking a knife to a gun-
fight." If there was to be a court-ap-
pointed expert, the lawyers thought 
that it was likely, if it was affordable, 
for there to also be at least one re-
tained expert on each side. 
The lawyers also believed that psy-
chological testimony in custody cases 
was a highly subjective process. One 
lawyer described it as "soft science." 
Additionally, contested custody cases 
were overwhelmingly close cases that 
might easily go either way, even 
though they were also highly emo-
tional cases where, unlike property 
disputes, there was little or no room 
for compromise. In these cases, "re-
fined advocacy" was necessary and a 
court-appointed expert simply did 
not help to promote an adversarial 
outcome. 
Because Texas judges are elected 
in partisan elections, we assumed 
that family district court judges 
would be especially sensitive to the 
concerns of family lawyers, if only to 
cultivate their support in election 
campaigns. If family lawyers were 
strongly opposed to the use of court-
appointed experts, we assumed the 
judges would be responsive to their 
concerns and reduce or eliminate 
court appointments. Interestingly, 
however, the Ft. Worth lawyers did 
not believe that partisan election of 
judges had any effect on the use of 
appointed experts. The Dallas 
County lawyers felt even more 
strongly that family court judges in 
Dallas County would not respond to 
lawyer hostility to court appointment 
of experts. In their view, family law-
yers were not the main constituency 
of judges. Rather, they argued that as 
Dallas has become increasingly Re-
publican, Dallas County judges need 
only worry about receiving the Re-
publican nomination and that nomi-
nation had no relationship to the 
views of family lawyers. 
The judges 
Not surprisingly, the judges respon-
sible for appointing experts found 
little problem with court appoint-
ment. Judges claim they use court-ap-
pointed experts to minimize bias. 
They assume that since the experts 
are court appointed, they do not 
have a hidden agenda. And, claim 
the judges, if experts do show bias, 
they will not be reappointed. In Ft. 
Worth, the judges say that there are 
four or five experts who regularly 
tend to be used as court-appointed 
experts. In Dallas, of course, there 
are more. In both jurisdictions, the 
judges tend to believe that a court-
appointed system encourages objec-
tivity, which helps to achieve their 
goal of obtaining neutral informa-
tion. 
The Dallas judges saw an advan-
tage in that court-appointed experts 
would get to interview all sides and 
thus they would tend to have a better 
sense of the custody situation. On the 
other hand, the Dallas judges did 
worry that court-appointed experts 
might get too much respect and 
might learn the biases of judges and 
try to please the judges too much. 
However, both the Dallas and Ft. 
Worth judges noted that cross-exami-
182 Judicature Volume 84, Number 4 January-February 2001 
nation of court-appointed experts 
could sometimes be intense because 
a special effort had to be made to 
make apparent their bias to the court 
and to the jury. 
Both the Dallas and Ft. Worth 
judges tried to obtain the coopera-
tion of attorneys by allowing them to 
select the court-appointed expert. If 
the attorneys could not agree on an 
expert or if the judge was not satis-
fied with the expert, the judge would 
sometimes provide a list of possibili-
ties from which the attorneys could 
choose. This method did not give at-
torneys control over the expert, but it 
offered them a role in the selection 
process. As the lawyers tended to be 
hostile to the idea of court appoint-
ment, this selection mechanism of-
fered to reduce the opposition of the 
lawyers. Payment of the expert would 
then come from the marital estate, 
although the experts stressed that 
obtaining payment was sometimes a 
struggle and that the judges could 
not be depended on to assist the ex-
perts. Along with the experts and the 
attorneys, the judges noted that if the 
money was available, lawyers would 
also present privately-retained ex-
perts. However, most cases involved 
limited resources, so the court-ap-
pointed expert was likely the only ex-
pert. 
A mixed picture 
Although family law cases present a 
unique opportunity to examine the 
use of court-appointed experts in the 
American legal system, it is important 
to be cautious in generalizing from 
these cases to their use across the le-
gal system. Family law cases have 
transformed the adversary system for 
many reasons, not the least of which 
is the concern that unabated 
adversarialness may be harmful to 
children. In addition, at least in the 
two counties studied, retained ex-
perts have not generally been permit-
ted to examine both parents and chil-
dren in custody/visitation disputes, 
which is a predicate for a competent 
comparative assessment. Thus, apart 
from generic critiques about the use 
of retained experts, these family law 
cases may present a special set of cir-
cumstances compelling the use of 
court-appointed experts not present 
in many other types of cases. 
Court-appointed experts have 
been used rarely in the civil or crimi-
nal justice system in America, but in 
Texas they are commonly used in 
family law cases. Thus, while we in-
tend to expand our ex-
amination of the use of 
court-appointed experts 
suits because of their testimony. 
Their comfort with the court-ap-
pointment system is very high. 
Judges are primarily concerned 
that court appointment provides 
them with a neutral opinion by an 
expert in an intensely difficult and 
emotional area of law. For Texas's 
expert has reached a conclusion, 
having interviewed both parties. 
However, it is not necessarily the 
case that costs are reduced by the 
use of court-appointed experts. If 
money is available, privately-re-
tained experts will be used, either in 
a testifying capacity, in a consulting 
capacity, or both. 
Finally, when an 
expert is court ap-
For judges, there appear to other jurisdictions, Texas family law cases 
presented a unique op-
portunity for this pilot 
study. What emerges 
from our discussions with 
experts, lawyers, and 
judges who work in this 
highly emotional area in 
Dallas and Tarrant coun-
to be no barriers to court 
appointment of experts and 
pointed, there is at 
least an aura of neutral-
ity about the expert. 
Court-appointed ex-
perts also interview 
both parents and thus 
will have more com-
plete information on 
which to base a conclu-
few downsides for doing so. 
ties is a mixed picture. 
Lawyers are concerned 
they lose control of the process when 
court-appointed experts are used. 
Their access to court-appointed ex-
perts is far less than their access to 
privately-retained experts. In addi-
tion, they are unable to prepare 
court-appointed experts for testi-
mony or for cross-examination and 
they cannot use the court-appointed 
expert for guidance in directing their 
case. 
Court-appointed experts are com-
monly used exclusively when the case 
is low budget, but if money is avail-
able, lawyers much prefer also hiring 
privately-retained experts. They fear 
that the court-appointed expert will 
receive too much respect from the 
judge or jury, although judges note 
that they have seen court-appointed 
experts rigorously attacked in cross-
examination. Additionally, at least 
the Dallas lawyers believe that many 
of the court-appointed experts lack 
sufficient competence. 
Although the lawyers bemoan the 
loss of control over the expert, the 
experts enjoy the independence they 
get from court appointment. Not be-
holden to lawyers, they perceive that 
they also are immune from civil law-
15. Krauss and Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise, 
and Experts in the Resolution of Contested Child Cus-
tody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB POL'y & L. (2000) 
(forthcoming) . 
family court judges, who have been 
immersed in a legal culture that 
uses court appointment of experts, 
there appear to be no barriers to ap-
pointment and few downsides for 
doing so. 
In short, the evaluations of court 
appointment of experts depends on 
one's role in the process. Nonethe-
less, several points emerge from our 
focus groups. These are the consider-
ations of control, cost, and neutrality, 
which find their echo in the larger 
debate about the use of court-ap-
pointed experts. 
Within the adversarial system, it is 
normally accepted that lawyers con-
trol the presentation of facts before 
the judge and jury, but that is lost 
with court-appointed experts. The 
experts are largely free of the law-
yers' control and have, at the mini-
mum, the aura of the judges' impri-
matur in their testimony. Although 
they may be subject to harsh cross-ex-
amination, they are far more free 
agents than are privately-retained ex-
perts. 
In low-budget custody cases, 
which are most of those in Dallas 
and Ft. Worth, limited resources 
may require that only the court-ap-
pointed expert is presented. Indeed, 
settlement may sometimes be en-
couraged where a court-appointed 
sion. It is a position 
that is much more ap-
pealing professionally 
for the expert witness. However, be-
cause there is little rigorous science 
underpinning most expert custody 
or visitation recommendations1S, the 
aura of neutrality and objectivity of 
court-appointed experts is trou-
bling. 
Despite complaints from the bar, 
the judges and experts we spoke to 
had a favorable impression of the 
use of court-appointed experts. But 
these impressions cannot substanti-
ate the claim that the use of court-
appointed experts is superior to the 
use of retained experts. Moreover, 
we do not know if the satisfaction 
expressed by judges and experts is 
generalizable to other judges and 
experts in Dallas and Ft. Worth, 
much less the rest of Texas. Even 
conceding that court appointment 
of experts in Texas family courts is 
working well, it is nonetheless un-
clear whether other case types will 
so easily permit the routine use of 
court-appointed experts. Nor is it 
clear whether it would be easy to es-
tablish elsewhere the kind of legal 
culture present in the Texas family 
court context that apparently ap-
preciates the advantages of the 
regular use of court-appointed ex-
perts. 4)1~ 
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